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510 VANGETJ v. VANGEL [51 C.2d 
minor matter or direct the commission to 
any technical errors of this type in its order. 
In my the order of the commission should be af-
except insofar as concerns the possible technical errors 
referred to above. 
concurred. 
of Public 1Jtilities Commission for 
was denied March 4, 1959. Gibson, C. J., and 
were of the that the petition should be 
A. Ko. 24725. In Bank. Feb. 3, 1959.] 
NICK VANGEL et al., Respondents, v. CHARI,ES 
VANGEL, Appellant. 
[1] Appeal-Law of Case-Matters Concluded.-Where the Su-
preme on a former appeal, held that a retiring partner 
was not limited to 23.96 per cent of post-dissolution profits 
because the contribution of his services in managing a ranch 
had not been taken into consideration, but did not say that 
this figure was incorrect as applied by the trial court to the 
inclusion of certain items in the partners' capital accounts, 
he may not as:;ert, on a subsequent appeal, that the 23.96 per 
cent vms since this matter was res judicata. 
[2] Id.-Law of Case-Matters Concluded.-A partner who was 
found to have caused the dissolution of a partner-
ship may not assert on appeal that the trial court erred in 
the sanctions expressed in Corp. Code, § 15038 (2b), 
where this was held to be correct and proper on a former 
appeal. 
[3] Partnership -Liquidation- Subsequent Profits.-Where the 
business of a ranch partnership was continued after dissolu-
tion with the of a retiring partner, he was not entitled, 
pending an to share in an amount he claimed to be 
the present value the ranch, based on the supposition that 
because its location the ranch would in the future have 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, § 685 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Appeal and § 98;") et 
See Cal.Jur.2d, § 120. 
Appeal and Error, § 1350; [3-6] 
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that value for subdivision 
placed on the ranch the 
tion was definitiYe of that 
relating to rights of a 
is continued, provides that 
the date of dissolution" shall be 
(4] !d.-Liquidation-Subsequent Profits.-Where the business of 
a ranch partnership was continued after dissolution with the 
assets of a retiring partner and he withdrew part of the total 
sum due him for his partnership no were due 
him for the use of such assets after they deposited 
to his order; he was entitled only to profits on the balance of 
his interest in the ranch, and where the trial court in its sound 
judgment, aided by the reports of several accountants, 
determined that such partner's share the post-dissolution 
profits amounted to a certain sum on a designated "cut-off" 
date, such determination, in the absence of judicial error, 
should not be disturbed on appeal. 
[5] !d.-Liquidation- Subsequent Profits.-A retiring partner's 
right to participate in the post-dissolution profits of a citrus 
ranch partnership was not improperly terminated as of May 
12, 1953, where it appeared that he was allowed profits on 
the 1952-1953 citrus crop to October 13, which would be 
the latest date that any profits could have accrued from his 
interest in the partnership property. 
[6] !d.-Liquidation-Subsequent Profits.-A partner who was 
found to have wrongfully caused dissolution of the partner-
ship and who, after the innocent partners were permitted to 
continue the partnership business with his assets, elected to 
take profits rather than interest on the value of his share in 
the partnership, could not successfully argue that he could not 
be put to an election between interest and profits until the 
amount due him had been settled, nor successfully 
claim that he was entitled to interest on the amount found 
due him until the amount was either paid or made available 
to him. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for dissolution of a partnership. J udgrnent for 
plain tiffs affirmed. 
Pacht, Ross, "\Varne & Bernhard, Isaac Pacht and Harvey 
M. Grossman for Appellant. 
Harold l\L Heimbaugh and George W. Rochester for Re-
spondents. 
Gl~ YAXGF.L 1'. YAXGEL 
C.AH'l'ER .I.---Defendant, Charles Vani-!·c1, appeals from 
a j1Hlgment ent<•red in an ad.ion instiinted in April, Hl.fG, by 
plaintiffs, Nick and EnH'st Vangel, for dissolution of' a part-
nership. 'l'he ease has now been tried four times and this 
appeal iN from the judgment PllterPd a ftPr the fourth trial. 
CVnnuel Y. Vangel, 116 Cal.App.2d 615 [254 P.2cl 91Dj; 
Vangel v. Vanuel, 45 Cal.2d 804 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.L.R.2d 
1385].) 
In May, 1944, Nick, Ernest and Charles VangPl, brothers, 
entered into an agreement for the purchase and operation of 
a 360-aere eitrus raneh. 'l'he agreement provided that title 
was to be taken in the indiYidual namrs of the three brothers, 
eaeh of whom was to contribute his pro rata share of the pnr-
dmsr priee and eaeh to own a one-third interest in the ranch. 
'l'he purchase of the raneh was eonsunnnated for $340,000, 
with a down payment of $120,000. Charles was unable to pay 
his full share of the down payment and borrowed $25,000 
from Nick and Ernest to make up his share of $40,000. 
After operations had commenced a dispute arose among the 
brothers >Yhieh culminated in an adion by Nick and Ernest 
to dissolYe the partnership. Inasmuch as our decision here 
must necessarily turn upon a construction of the opinion 
renclrred by the District Court of Appeal in Vangel v. Vangel, 
116 Cal.App.2d 615 [254 P.2d 919], and by this court on 
Deeember 23, 1955, ·we will set forth in some detail the perti-
nent portions thereof. Unless otherwise noted, the emphasis 
is hrrr added. In Vangel v. Vangel, 45 Cal.2d 804, 806, 807, 
808, 809, 810 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.L.R2d 1385], we held: "By 
the prior judgment, a dissolution was deereed effeetive as of 
June 15, 1950. The eourt found that Charles wrongfully 
eaused the dissolution and concluded that Nick and Ernest 
were privileged to purchase his interest. The ya]ue of the 
raneh was fixed at $235,000, and a finding was made as to 
the Yalue of Charles' interest in the partnership. According 
to another finding, he was entitled to participate in profits 
aceruing between the date of dissolution and ,January 1, 1951. 
"Upon the prior appeal [Va11[!el v. Vangel, 116 Cal.App. 
2d 615 (254 P.2d 919)], findings as to the Yalue of the ranch 
property and Charles' fault in causing the disRolution were 
approved. It was held that the trial jndge pl'opeTly allowed 
the plaintiffs to purchase Charles' 'inleTest, but that he erred 
1'n failing to inclncle certain ·items in his val1wfion of it. 
Purthermore, said the District Court of Appeal, the rigl!t of 
Charles to participate in profits accunmlated by joint use of 
VANGEL 
[51 C.2d 
VANGEL 
334 p .2d 8631 
assets should not have been 
1, 1951. That it 
tencl so as to include the 
matured and soon 
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of 
left to the sound 
matters, the judgment was reversed with directions for an 
accounting. 
"'l'he amounts of 
after dissolution of 
of the ram:h 
and advances, as determined upon the 
disputed. The value of Charles' interest in the 
the time of dissolution based upon those amounts, 
to be :23.96 per cent of the partnership net ·worth. 
also declared that Charles is entitled to that 
of the profits the the ranch 
elaims 
not now 
court 
tween the elate of dissolution and the up of the part-
nerslu:p affairs. Another findi11g is that 'whatever services 
defendant may have rendered toward the condud of the 
partnen;hip affairs, from the date of the dissolution of the 
partnership ... 1vas voluntary on his part and against the 
wishes and directions of the plaintifi's.' 
"The judgment gives Nick and Ernest, inta alia, the right 
to purchase Charles' interest in the partnership for its value 
as determined at tbe retrial, plus interest on that mnount 
ft·mn September 8, 1.953. Charles is allowed 23.96 per cent 
of the profits aceruing prior to that date and the same per-
centage of ceetain proc-eeds from sales of erops. He is denied 
any wages sen·iccs the dissolution tbe 
partrwrshJp and must pay 23.96 prr rent of the audit. 
''Charles contends that the trial erred in his com-
putations of the ya!ues at the time of the dissolutiou, o£ the 
respective partner~hip interests and of the partners' shares 
o£ the profits aerrning between dissolution and the wiuding 
up of the partnership affairs. He also challenges the finding 
that his post-dissolution serviees were 'voluntary' and 'against 
the wishes and direetions of the plaintiffs' as being wii hout 
support in the evidenee. Finally, he eoutends that he should 
not have been taxed any of the costs of condueting the audit 
upon tlJe retrial. 
"With regard to the value of the partnership interests, 
Charles argues that the trial judge erred in including in the 
partners' capital aceounts items which properly are personal 
obligations of the partners inter sese. He objeds particularly 
51 C.2d-17 
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to the indusion of an item of advanced to him the 
other partners upon the purehase of the and another 
one of $42,000, which his brothers assertedly withdrew im-
properly from partnership funds. 
"Upon the former appeal, however, it was held that these 
items were, respeetively, an obligation owing to the partner-
ship and a distribution of profits. By ineluding those items 
in his eomputations of the values of the partners' interests 
in the partnership, the trial judge followed the mandate of 
the Distriet Court of Appeal: 'In ascertaining such interest 
not only is the value of the raneh to be eonsidered as of that 
date [June 15, 1950] as well as other capital assets, liabilities 
and expenses, but also the claims whieh the partnership had 
against the brothers ancl their set-offs among themselves should 
have been eompnted as of June 15, 1950, with interest to that 
time.' (Emphasis added, 116 Cal.App.2d 629-630.) The court 
further said 'in determining the respective financial interests 
in the partnership business as of that date consideration must 
be given to the $25,000 whieh plaintiffs advanced for defend-
ant, and to the $42,000 which plaintiffs improperly withheld 
and distributed, together with interest on said sums to date 
of dissolution. All other assets and liabilities of the partner-
ship, together with any claims of the parties inter se, must be 
included in the ascertainment of the respective interests of 
the plaintiffs and the defendant.' 
"In attacking the portion of the judgment lin1iting him 
to 23.96 per cent of the post-dissolution profits, Charles has 
presented several theories as justifying a larger amount. It is 
1mnecessary to conside1· all of thern, however, becanse the com-
putation of his share was made upon an erroneous basis. 
"Upon the former appeal it was held that the trial judge 
was correct in concluding that the partnership had been dis-
solved by reason of Charles' breach of the partnership agree-
ment and that the remaining partners had exercised their 
privilege of continuing the partnership business. (Corp. Code, 
§ 15038, subd. (2b).) In that situation, Charles was entitled 
to haYe computed the value of his interest in the partnership, 
exelusive of his share of the good will of the business, and less 
any damages caused to his copartners. (Corp. Code, § 15038, 
subd. (2e II).) For the use of his partnership assets in the 
continuing business, pending a settlement of the aeeounts, he 
was entitled to receive 'as an ordinary creditor an amount 
equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership 
with interl'~st, or, at his option ... in lieu of interest, the 
Feb. 1959] VANGEL V. VANGEL 
f 51 C.2d 510; 334 P.2d 863] 
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profits attributable to the use his right in the property 
of the dissolved partnership.' (Emphasis added; Corp. Code, 
§ 15042.) Said the District Court of Appeal, 'Prom the posi-
tion dcf enrlant has taken on this it is fair to say that 
he has elected to take mther than interest on the value 
of his share the ' (116 Cal.App.2d 629.) 
'' 'rbe record the rather unusual situation of a 
partner, expelled from the partnership for cause and by 
juditial to participate with l1is former 
partners in the operation and management of the business. 
Charles contends that he is entitled to receive compensation 
for serviees so performed. In reply, his brothers rely upon 
the finding that his post-dissolution services were voluntary 
and against their wishes. However, the evidence does not 
support that finding. It appears that Charles continued to 
participate in the business in substantially the same manner 
as before the action for dissolution. 'l'here is no evidence of 
any protest by his brothers. On the contrary, they appear 
to have acquiesced fully in his continuing services. 
''Section 15042 of the Corporations Code fixes the right of 
one retired from a partnership for cause, or the personal rep-
resentative of a deceased partner, to recover compensation 
for the use of his assets in the continuing business pending 
an accounting. In such case, he is entitled to 'the profits 
attributable to the use of his right in the property.' As a 
practical matter, his share of the profits usually is computed 
on the basis of the ratio that his share of the partnership assets 
bears to the whole of them. [Citations.] However, that 
division may not be equitable when the contribution to profits 
from eapital is relatively minor in comparison to the contribu-
tion from the skills or services of one conducting the business. 
In such a cm;e, the managing partner may be entitled to a 
greater share of the profits. [ CitatioHs.] Although such a 
method of dividing profits is usually spoken of in terms of 
providing extra compensation for the managing ex-partner, 
in reality it merely reflects the statutory requirement that 
the retired or dcecased partner be allowed the profits at-
tributable to his right in the assets used in the business. 
"..\ro California ease eonsidcrs the right to compensation 
for serviees in a continuing lmsiness of one whose fanlt has 
caused t lle dissolntion of tlw part1wrship. 'l'he authorities 
in other jnrisdidion nre in eonfliet. [Citations.] 'l'hose whieh 
deny rPcove1·y f!:enerally proeeed upon a theory similar to 
the unclean hands principle; most of the decisions whieh allow 
516 
recovery 
must 
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upon the principle that one who seeks 
case th c balance the favors the 
based npon services rendered. The 
here shown is one which involves a con-
and skill in the cnlt1:vation anrl 
it woulrl be in-
his services when 
[plaintiffs] take the position, however, 
that profits be apportioned according 
to the values of the partnership interests without compensa-
tion to Charles for his post-dissolution seniees is the law of 
the rase as established in "Vangel v. "Vangel, supra. It is un-
necessary to pass upon this contention. 'The doetrine of the 
law of the ease is reeognized as a harsh one ... and the 
modern view is that it should 110t be adhered to when the 
applieation of it results in a mauifestly unjust decision.' 
v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 14 Cal.2d 791, 795 
[97 P.2d 813].) Bven if the tleeision upon the formrr ap-
peal he construed as limiting the apportionment of profits 
in the manner suggested, it would be unjust to do so, and the 
deeision should not be followed to that extent. 
"1'he judgment, as it determines the value of the 
partnership interests and the total amount of post-clissolu-
tion to be distributc(l among the ex-partners, is based 
upon findings wh1:ch arc supported by substantial evidence. 
II ow ever, those arc divided sol ely upon the basis of 
the relative L'alucs the interests ·in the partner-
ship The amomd of profits attributable to the use 
of Charles' share of the asscsts [sic] and also those allocable 
to his services in the continuing b?isincss should have been 
considered in the apportionment. 
"No error is shown in the award of: costs. A proeeeding to 
dissolve and liquidate a partnership is controlled by equitable 
principlPs [eitations] and the trial judge has a broad dis-
c-retion in fixing costs 
reversed 1cith directions to the trial 
accordance with this opinion, the re-
to 1chich each partner is cnt,itlcd. 
In all other the Judgment 1:s 'rhe eosts upon 
1 his appeal shall be divided equally between the appellant 
and the respondents.'' 
Feb. 517 
SuMMARY oF DmECTIONS 
\VE Ih:l,IJ (in addition to what had theretofore been ad-
jurlicated) : 
1. That Charles ~was entitled to a share of the post-dissolu-
tion profits attributable to the use of his share of the partner-
ship assets. 
2. That Charles was entitled to compensation for his ser-
vices in the continuing business. 
3. That Charles was not limited to 23.96 per cent of the 
post-dissolution profits because the contribution of his ser-
vices in managing the ranch had not been taken into con-
:,;ideration. 
'l'he 23.96 percentage was achieved in this way: 
PARTNERS' CAPITAL: Gross assets of partnership (~with value 
of partnership real improvements and supplies fixed at 
$235,000) less gross liabilities. 
Balance, at Nick Ernest Charles 
33% per 
cent each $67,611.98 $67,611.99 $67,611.99 
Adjustments-Liability of Charles Vangel 
to Nick and Ernest Vangel in the amount 
of $25,000, plus interest at 7 per een: 
from April 16, 1945 to June 15, 1950 
17,021.23 17,021.23 ( 34,042.46) 
Liability of Nick and Ernest Vangel to 
Charles Vangel in amount of $14,000 (% of $42,000), plus interest at 7 per 
cent from May 27, 1949 to June 15, 1950 
(7,515.51) (7,515.51) 15,031.02 
Financial 
interests $77,117.70 
Interest in 
percentages 38.02% 38.02% 23.96% 
Total 
$202,835.96 
After onr decision, upon the retrial, the court found: 
1. That this court affirmed the 23.96 per cent figure, both 
as to the former partnership interests and the post-dissolution 
profits from June 15, 1950, the adjudged dissolution date, 
''to and including the 1953 crops harvested and unharvested, 
the cut-off date being May 12, 1953." (Finding III.) 
2. That defendant's interest in the value of the ranch, at 
the time of dissolution, on the basis of 23.96 per cent was 
found by Judge Vickers to be $37,440.45; that this figure 
was affirmed by this court. (Finding IV.) 
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~L 'l'hat defendant 
at the datP or <lissolut ion of t h(· I was] 
$4R,GOO.:J:J. (Finding IY.) 
4. 'l'hat drfen<lant';.; inlen'st in iion profits from 
,J nne 15, 1950, to May 12, J 97)8 ''the terminal elate found by 
,Judge Vickers and affirmed by the Supreme Court" amounted 
to $4G,849.8:J. (I''inding IV.) 
5. That certain monies had been paid to plaintiffs subse. 
qnent to May 12, 1953. and up to Oetober 13, 1953, and that 
defendant's interest therein was $9,024.7 4. (Pinding IV.) 
6. 'J'hat the "total of Defendant's interest 'attributable 
to the use of Charles' (Defendant) share of assets' in the 
former partnership is $140,915.18." (Pin <ling IV.) 
7. That Charlrs had ·withdrawn from the total sum of 
$140,915.13 the sum of $81,999.45, leaving a balance due 
him of $58,915.G8 (this latter sum is exclusive of the com· 
pen;;;ation found to be due to defendant as will hereinafter 
appear). (.B'inding VI.) 
8. That Charles had not been the exclusive manager and 
supervisor of the ranch; that ''much'' of what defendant did 
was over the protest of the plaintiffs and not with their 
"full acquiescence"; that defendant's services were of the 
management type and not that of a mere rmployee; that the 
post-dissolution services rendered by defendant were from 
June 15, 1950, to NoYember 10, 1958; that defendant rendered 
no services thereafter. (.B'inding VII, in part.) 
9. "That it is true the value of services for managing and 
superYising a citrus ranch the size of the cultivated portion 
of the Cascade Raneh is from $198.75 to $238.50 a month. 
'l'he court finds that the services of Defendant are worth on the 
average not to exceed $200 a month for the prriod from 
June 15, 1950, to November 10, 1958, or a total amount of 
$8,200.00." (Pin ding VII.) 
10. It was provided that because of a stipulation entered 
into between the parties, defendant was to pay 28.96 per 
cent of $1,950 charged by an accountant employed by the 
parties. ( l<'incling VIII.) 
Charles contends that the trial court erred in terminating 
his right to profits as of May 12, 1953. In subheading 4, 
just set forth, we pointrd out that Finding IV is to the 
effect that Judge Vicker's finding of the terminal date as 
?,l[ay 12, 1953, was affirmed by this court. There is no such 
affirmation. In commenting upon the decision of the District 
Court of Appeal in Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal.App.2d 615 
Feh.1959] VANGEL V. VANGEL 
[51 C.2d 510; 334 P.2d 863] 
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[254 P.2d , vvc said that Charles' right to participate 
in post-dissolution profits "should not have been terminated 
as of January 1, 1931. That period, it vvas determined, should 
extend so as to include the proee0ds from fruit substantially 
matured and soon ready for marketing, the final date to be 
left to the sound judgment of the ebaneellor." v 
Vangel, 43 Cal.2d 806 P.2d 55 A.L.R.2d .) 
In a memorandum ruling B'ebruary 4, 1957, by Judge 
Clarence .M. Hanson it is stated: "The findings of Judge 
Vickers, earricd into the judgment he rendered, granted to 
the defendant 23.96 per cent of the value of the partnership 
property ($235,000) as of the date of dissolution on June 15, 
1950, plus 23.96 per cent of the post-dissolution profits from 
,Juno 15, 1950, to and including the 1953 crops harvested 
and unharve:o;ted on 1VIay 12, 1953, but as he did not include 
anything for the serviees render0d by the defendant from 
June 15, 1950, to that date, the judgment was reversed with 
instructions to ascertain the amount. The Supreme Court did 
not suggest that the cnt-off date 'lDas to be irlay 12, 1953, but 
that is probably what it had in mind. II owever, if a later date 
should be proper, as the defendant emltc11ds, it may not ,in any 
event go beyond N ovcmbcr 10, 1953 . ... " 'l'he memorandum 
opinion then sets forth part of an affidavit signed by Charles 
wherein he states he has done uo work on the ranch subse-
quent to .1\owmber 10, 1953. November 10, 1953, was ap-
parently the date judgment was entered afier the third trial. 
In the alternative, Charles argues that if he is not entitled 
to a share of the profits subsequent to May 12, 1953, that he 
is eutitled to interest on the balance c:llw him as of that date. 
Section 15042 of the Corporations Code provides that a partner 
in Charles' position is entitled to "an amount equal to the 
value of l1is interest in the dissolved partnership" or "In 
lieu of interest the profits attributable to the use of his right 
in the property of the dissolved partnership." The District 
Court of Appeal noted (116 Cal.App.2c1 629) that "From 
the position defendant has taken on this appeal it is fair to 
say that he has elected to take profits rather than interest 
on the 'l)aluc of his share of the partnership." (See also 
Vangel v. Vanucl, 45 Cal.2cl 804, 808 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.I1.R 
2d1385].) 
By Chari es' own admission, he pedormed no scrviees after 
November 10, 1963, the date on which the trial court ter-
minated any right to compensation for services. He does argue 
that his services had been found, on a prior trial, to be worth 
520 VANGEL V. V ANGEI, [51 C.2d 
per month as 
him on the instant trial. 
evidence was adduced at the the judgment of which is 
now under aw:l that there is ample evidence in 
the record to substantiate the trial court's finding that 
Charles' scrviees were worth $200 per month, or a total 
amount of 
[1] Charles argues, he has done 
per cent is incorrect and seeks to 
tion of the two items of and 
the disposi-
$42,000 which were 
116 Cal.App.2d 615, 
, and in v. ·vangel, 45 Cal.2d 
804, 807 55 A.L.R.2d 1385]. We did not say, 
in the latter ease, that the 23.96 per cent figure was incorrect 
because of the disposition of the two amounts, but that 
Charles' share of the post-dissolution profits was incorrect 
because his to compensation had not been taken into 
consideration. There is no merit to this contention inasmuch 
as the matter is res judicata. 
[2] 'fhcre is no merit to Charles' contention that the 
trial court erred in applying the provisions of section 15038, 
subdivision of the Corporations Code. This was held 
to be correct and proper in Yangel v. Yangel, 116 Cal.App.2d 
615, 628 [254 P.2d 919], and reaffirmed by this court in 
Vangel v. Yangel, ·15 Cal.2d 804, 808 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.L.R. 
2d 
[3] There no merit to Charles' eontention that he is 
entitled to share in what he claims is the present value of the 
ranch, the sum of $2,000,000. His claim is based on his 
argument that because of the location of the ranch it will have 
that value for subdivision purposes. In Vangel v. Yangel, 
116 Cal.App.2d 615, 633 [254 P.2d 919], the court noted 
that the valuation of $235,000 placed on the ranch by the 
trial court at the date of dissolution of the partnership was 
''definitive of that question.'' Furthermore, section 15042 
of the Corporations Code provides that the retiring partner's 
interest "at the date of dissolution" shall be ascertained. 
(See Vangel v. 116 Ca1.App.2d 6]5, 627, 628, 629 
[254 P.2d .) 
[4] Plaintiffs argue that the sum of $38,090.45 ($37,440.45 
plus $650 has been available to Charles since Sep-
tember 10, 1953. This statement is substantiated by the record. 
Charles' Bxhibit ''A.,'' the Pritkin, Finkel and Company Ac-
eountants' Report, page 2, shows such deposits in escrow to 
VANGEIJ V. VANGEL 
151 C.2d 510; 334 P.2d 863] 
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Plaintiffs also out that the amount 
,115.68) after the fourth has been 
:3, Hl53. The record shows (Charles' Ex-
hibit "A") that from the $38,090.45 deposited in 
Charles has withdrawn the sum of $6,982.10. The rerord 
also shows refiecti~d in the that Charles had 
made other withdrawals in the sum of $75,017.35.* It was 
then found that Charles had a balance due him of $58,915.68 
the sum of $8,200 as compensation for his services, mak-
a total due Charles of $67,115.68, which has been de-
posited in escrow to Charles' account since May, 1957. It 
appears to us that the trial court correctly carried out the 
mandate of the District Court of Appeal and that of this 
court and that there has been no error. After the amounts 
due Charles as his original share of the partnership assets 
had been deposited to his order, it is obvious that no profits 
were due him from the use of such assets. Charles' interest 
in the real property had been adjudged to be $37,440.45; his 
interest as of ,June 15, 1950 (the date of dissolution), is shown 
by his Rxhibit ''A'' to be $48,600.55; his share of the post-
dissolution profits from June 15, 1950 to May 12, 1953, as 
shown by Charles' Exhibit "A" amount to $45,849.39; and 
his share of the profits on the 1952-1953 crop whic~h was ap-
parently harvested by October 13, 1953, amount to $9,024.74, 
or a total balance of $140,915.13. Charles' withdrawals from 
this amount have been heretofore set forth. It will be recalled 
that in Vanoel v. Vangel, 116 Cal.App.2d 615, 630 [254 P.2d 
919], it was held that Charles should be entitled to his share 
of the proceeds of a "erop substantiall.v matured and soon 
ready for market. \Vhile no formula or precise definition can 
br laid down to determine when such fruit has substantiall;' 
matured, this determination can properly be left to the sound 
judgment of the chancellor." As heretofore noted, there was 
no petition for hearing after that decision, and our opinion in 
Vanoel v. Vangel, 45 Ca1.2d 804 [291 P.2d 25, 55 A.hR.2d 
1385], did not disturb that holding. While we did not, as 
found by the trial eourt during i his trial, approve May 12, 
1953, as a "cut-off" date, we did not hold otherwise and 
reversed only for the purpose of allowing Charles compen-
sation for his post-disso1 ntion managerial efforts on behalf 
of tiw partnership. Since the trial court has here, in its sound 
'"It appears from a letter written by Judge Hanson, dated April 11, 
19G7, to the attorneys of record, that defendant Charles had received 
this sum d i reetly from the partnership. 
C'.2<1 
judgment, aided by the reports of sevm·al rpmlified aeeounl-
ants determined that Charles' interests arc as have bec•n here-
tofore set forth, and since there has heen no judleial error, 
there appears to be no reason to disturb its judgment. 
[5] From what has just been said it is dear that there 
is no merit to Charles' contention that his right to participate 
in the partnership profits should not have been terminated 
as of 1\'Iay 12, 1953, since it appears from the record that he 
was allmved profits on the 1952-1953 crop to October 13, 195~~, 
which would be the latest date that any profits could have 
acerued from his interest in the partlwrship real property. As 
heretofore set forth, Charles' share of the value of the partner-
ship real property was deposited in escrow to his account on 
September 10, 1953. 
[6] Charles also argues that he cannot be put to an election 
between interest and profits until the amount due him has 
been finally settled. This argument stems from the statement 
made by the District Court of Appeal, 116 Cal.App.2d 615, 
630, that since the accounts of the partnership had not been 
"properly settled ... he was not required to accept the 
offer made to purchase his share after the rendition of final 
judgment, since the accounting should have proceeded 'upon 
different principles than did the accounting which was actu-
ally taken.' (Nuland v. Pruyn, supra [99 Cal.App.2d 603 
(222 P.2d 261)])." The same court pointed out, however, 
that "From the position defendant has taken on this appeal 
it is fair to say that he has elected to take profits rather than 
interest on the val1w of his share in the partnership.'' ( 116 
Cal.App.2d 615, 629.) 
Charles also claims that he is entitled to interest on the 
amount found to be due him until that amount is either paid, 
or made available to him. From what has been heretofore 
said it is obvious that there is no merit to this argument. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
